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ABSTRACT
The explosive growth of the Internet has brought thousands of companies exciting, new
electronic contact with their customers. It has also brought them equally exciting
contact with a cadre of ingenious and persistent hackers. Increasingly companies are
turning to firewalls to thwart these wily hackers. While firewalls are very effective,
often they are not the security panacea they are made out to be. This paper presents a
risk assessment of a hypothetical firewall using the Security-Specific Eight-Stage Risk
Assessment Methodology which illuminates where the security flaws lie. The example
serves as guidance for assessing firewalls in general. We discuss the lessons we learned
performing actual assessments which lead to recommendations for improving the
security surrounding firewalls.
INTRODUCTION
In our 1994 paper [1] we identified three major flaws in existing security risk
assessment methodologies. We presented our new security-specific eight-stage risk
assessment which addresses these shortcomings. In this paper we show how the
methodology may be applied to a firewall, a security mechanism of considerable
current interest. We begin with a brief overview of the methodology. The overview is
followed by a representative application of the methodology to a firewall that was
drawn from our firewall evaluations. The results of the assessment lead us around to a
recurring security risk and a proposal for improving firewalls to address this risk.
1. THE EIGHT-STAGE METHODOLOGY
This risk assessment of a generic, hypothetical firewall employs the Security-Specific
Eight-Stage Risk Assessment Methodology [1]; henceforth referred to as the eight-stage
methodology. The eight stages of the methodology are illustrated in Figure 1, The
Eight-Stage Model.
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Figure 1. The Eight-Stage ModelIn Figure 1, time flows from left to right.  The internal influences are depicted as
squares.  The external influence (a security-related attack) to the system is depicted as a
triangle.  The consequences are depicted as circles. The objective of the security system
is to prevent unwanted consequences of the security attack by employing the activities
represented in the squares. The consequences, represented by circles, will occur if these
activities are insufficient. One of the major principles of the model is that a system
under attack has three opportunities to reduce the resultant harm: before the attack
occurs, after the attack occurs but before a security breach occurs, and after a security
breach occurs but before the resultant harm occurs.
When performing an assessment, we assess more than the firewall itself.  We include
both the automated security mechanisms of the firewall and the procedural
requirements levied on the users and administrators.  We refer to this without
ambiguity as the “system”.  The eight-stage model is used to evaluate this system.
Performing an assessment using the eight-stage methodology involves two major steps:
• data gathering
• construction of eight-stage chains of security-relevant events and performing the
quantitative analysis.
Both of these steps are described in the subsections below.
1.1 Gathering Data
The steps to gather the data for the assessment are:
1. Obtain the definition of the security boundary and the interfaces that will be
defended by the firewall, both automatically and procedurally.  The definition
should be provided in the security policy.
2. Obtain the list of system assets to be protected, what constitutes a security breach,
the associated harm that could befall the assets, and a quantitative loss per asset if it
were compromised, modified by an unauthorized agent, or its availability were lost.
This list should also be provided in the security policy.
3. Delineate the attack scenarios that will (and will not) be defended against, and the
likelihood of occurrence of each.  For firewall assessments, we have collected a long
list of attack scenarios that cover most insider and outsider attacks.
4. Delineate each of the system's countermeasures that protect it against attack. A
determination is made for each countermeasure if it is used to obstruct, detect or
recover from an attack, or to detect or recover from a security breach. This
distinction is used to support the quantitative assessment of each countermeasure's
effectiveness.1.2 Constructing the Chains and Performing the Analysis
The lists resulting from the data gathering phase are used to construct eight-stage event
chains.  One eight-stage chain is constructed for each attack scenario.  In the
appropriate stages, all applicable countermeasures, breaches, and are listed.
For each of the attack scenarios, the system's ability to defend against it is calculated
based on the quantitative measures collected in section 1.1. There are eight data points
that are collected during the data gathering phase for the eight-stage event chains: the
effectiveness of the attack obstruction (CEAO), the likelihood of an attack within one
year (PRA), the effectiveness of the attack detection (CEAD), the effectiveness of the
attack recovery (CEAR), the loss in dollars if a security breach occurs (PLB), the
effectiveness of the breach detection (CEBD), the effectiveness of the breach recovery
(CEBR), and the total value in dollars of the assets at risk in the attack scenario (PLH).
The likelihood of an attack is stated as the average number of attacks that will occur
within a year.  This is a departure from our 1994 paper [1] where we had assumed that
the number of attacks would be less one per year.  Anyone who reads the newspaper
knows that this is no longer the case.  All effectiveness measures are stated as
probabilities ranging from 0.0 to 1.0.  In our years of using this methodology, we found
that the actual loss in dollars related to the security breach, PLB, was always so low that
it was not worth tracking.  For example, if a hacker were breaking into a system, most
security policies state that a security breach has occurred as soon as the hacker, as an
unauthorized user, has somehow logged into the system.  But at that point, no real
dollar loss has occurred.  There are exceptions, but to simplify the equations in this
paper, we will assume that PLB is always zero.
The likelihood that an attack will happen in one year and successfully result in a
security breach (ERB) is PRA • (1 - (CETO + ((1 - CETO) • CEAD • CEAR))).  The likelihood
that an attack will happen and successfully result in a harm (ERH) is ERB • (1 - (CEBD •
CEBR)).  The potential dollar loss per year (ELT) for the one attack scenario being
analyzed is PLH • ERT.
It is important to keep in mind that the effectiveness measure for the attack obstruction
(CEAO) is the combined effectiveness of all of the mechanisms being used for attack
obstruction against the one attack scenario being analyzed.  Additional analysis may
need to be performed to determine how all of these attack obstruction mechanisms
interplay.  The same is true for the analysis of the effectiveness for all detection and
recovery mechanisms.  In cases where mechanisms have different reactions based on
situations, it may be necessary to decompose the analysis into more specific attack
scenarios, resulting in more eight-stage event chains to analyze.  See our earlier work
[1] for the underlying formulation of all calculations.2. APPLYING THE METHODOLOGY TO AN EXAMPLE FIREWALL
The example firewall that we will use is an amalgamation of the actual systems that we
have assessed.  The asset values, likelihoods, and effectiveness measures used in the
example are drawn from these assessments.  Our example firewall is a bastion host
using IP-based filtering with an external router connected to the Internet. It is used to
protect company proprietary data, including financial and Privacy Act data, on a
collection of LANs supporting various computing platforms. We constructed this
example system because of its commonality to current firewall installations.  Our
example allows only the following data flows:
     • e-mail in both directions
     • both internal and external hosts are allowed to "ping" the firewall (for
connectivity testing)
     • both in-coming and out-going Domain Name Service (DNS) requests
     • non-anonymous File Transfer Protocol (ftp)
     • World Wide Web.
In the following subsections we proceed through an abbreviated assessment, following
the steps described in subsections 1.1 and 1.2.  Given the space constraints, the tables
provide examples and are not exhaustive.
2.1 Gathering Data
Table 1, Security Policy, synopsizes the example firewall's security policy. While the
security policy should be provided by the system owner, in all of our assessments that
was not the case and developing the security policy was our first task. The table is
divided into three sections: the security boundary, the automated defenses of the
firewall, and procedural defenses which are the responsibility of the users and
administrators.
An abbreviated list of the assets to be protected are given in Table 2, Protected Assets.
Listed with each asset are the types of breaches associated with its loss, the type of the
resulting harm, and the value of the resulting harm. Table 3, Attack Scenarios, lists
some of the attack scenarios that will and will not be defended against by the firewall,
and the likelihood of occurrence of each. The attack scenarios that will not be defended
against are addressed so that a true level of vulnerability can be assessed. Impossible
attack scenarios for this example, such as those using telnet, are excluded since the
firewall completely precludes their being enacted.Table 1.  Security Policy
Security Boundary
All internal network nodes and the firewall itself
Automated Defenses
Users on the outside network and users on the inside network are prohibited from all interaction with
the firewall with the exception of e-mail, ping/echo, DNS, and an extremely limited ftp capability.
E-mail is allowed to pass between the internal network and the Internet.
Users on the external network are allowed to ping the firewall.
DNS is allowed for both in-coming and out-going requests and replies.
Outbound requests for file transfers using ftp from the internal network to the Internet are permitted.
Inbound requests for file transfers using ftp from the Internet to a designated ftp site within the internal
network are permitted.
Outbound requests from the internal network for WWW access to the Internet are permitted, with Java
disabled.
Internal network addresses are hidden from the external network.
Procedural Defenses
Users are not allowed to modify the e-mail program.
Users are not allowed to e-mail proprietary and/or private data over the Internet.
Users are not allowed to automatically forward e-mail to the Internet.
Administrators of the firewall must securely administer the system.
Users must be wary of all data received over the Internet, independent of its source.
Users and administrators must take great care in selecting programs which support web browsers.
Proprietary or private data must never be placed in the outgoing ftp directory.
Table 2.  Protected Assets
Asset Breach* Harm‡ Value
Firewall CPU time A R, T $100/hr.
Firewall system files I M $1,000/file
Firewall disk space A R $300/Mb
Web site on firewall I, A R, T $400
Firewall password file C, I M $1,000
Ftp file site A R, T $2,000
Firewall e-mail service A R, T $500
CPU time on non-firewall systems A R $500
Privacy Act Data C, I, A M, P $10,000
E-mail messages C, I M $5000
Financial records C, I, A M, D $50,000
*C = loss of confidentiality, I = loss of integrity, A = loss of availability
‡M = failure of mission, P = loss of personnel, R = loss of resources, D = loss of dollars, T = loss of timeTable 3.  Attack Scenarios
Attack Scenario Defended
Against
Likelihood
Hacker floods firewall network ports No .01
Hacker peruses e-mail traffic Via procedures .01
Hacker forges e-mail return address No 5.00
Hacker attempts to use the sendmail security holes Yes 2.00
Hacker spoofs Internet’s DNS Yes .01
Hacker attack on FTP Yes 6.00
Viruses received via the WWW infect internal programs Via procedures 3.00
User inadvertently violates security policy Via procedures 100.00
System administrator inadvertently misconfigures firewall Via procedures 3.00
Table 4, System Countermeasures, lists several of the countermeasures that the system
provides and their types.
Table 4.  System Countermeasures
System Countermeasure Type
Packet blocking Obstruction
Packet filtering Obstruction
Services written with secure features Obstruction
Security education Obstruction
Audit log analysis Attack & Breach Detection
Automated alarms Attack & Breach Detection
User detection of file modification Breach Detection
User detection of mail spoofing Attack Detection
Statistics utility results analysis Attack & Breach Detection
User detection of system malfunction Breach Detection
Firewall reconfiguration Attack & Breach Detection
Firewall shutdown Attack & Breach Detection
Firewall reinitialization Attack & Breach Detection
Turning off firewall services Attack & Breach Detection
2.2 Constructing the Chains and Performing the Analysis
Since space does not permit reproducing the results of all attack scenarios, we have
selected two representative samples. A typical assessment would have approximately
80 chains.  The first example, Table 5, Automated Attack Scenario, illustrates an attack
against which the firewall is designed to protect. The second, Table 6, Human Error
Scenario, illustrates the type of human error against which the firewall cannot protect
itself.
The scenarios are presented in tables, each containing an eight-stage model of the attack
being enacted. The tables should be read as a time-line, progressing from stage 1
through stage 8. The stages are listed in the first column, and the instance in the second
column. The third column provides the quantitative measures associated with theinstance as described in section 1.2.  The important results are the total effective risk,
ERT, and the loss that is associated with it, ELT.  Table 5 is the analysis of a hacker
attacking a firewall protocol that is allowed, sendmail’s SMTP protocol, but is secured
by the use of the latest version of sendmail.  It’s obstruction effectiveness is very high,
but it’s not guaranteed to be impenetrable.  This is reflected in the bottom line by the
low level of risk and effective loss.
Table 5.  Automated Attack Scenario:  sendmail attack
Stage Instance Effectiveness, likelihood, or
potential loss level
1. Attack
obstruction
Service written with secure feature:  firewall’s use
of secure version of sendmail.
Effectiveness (CEAO):  .99
2. Attack
scenario
Hacker attempts to use the sendmail security
holes to gain access to firewall.
Likelihood (PRA):  2.0
3. Attack
detection
Audit log analysis; automated alarms Effectiveness (CEAD):  .9
4. Attack
recovery
Turning off firewall services; firewall shutdown Effectiveness (CEAR):  .9
5. Security
breach
Hacker gains access to firewall CPU time,
system files, and disk space
Effective risk (ERB):  .004
6. Breach
detection
Audit log analysis; automated alarms; statistics
utility results analysis
Effectiveness (CEAD):  .9
7. Breach
recovery
Turning off firewall services; firewall shutdown Effectiveness (CEBR):  .9
8. Harm Loss of resources, time, and money. Potential loss (PLH):  $9,100
Total effective risk (ERT):  .001
Total effective loss (ELT):  $6.57
Table 6 addresses a very different type of scenario:  human error on the part of the
firewall administrator.  Despite the best of intentions on the administrator’s part, he or
she will make approximately three misconfigurations per year that the firewall will not
prevent, of which a hacker could take advantage.  Note that the total effective risk is 45
times higher than in the previous scenario, and the total effective loss per year is 27
times higher.
The two examples were chosen for their illustrative capabilities.  Summing the Total
Effective Loss values for all eight-stage event chains results in the average dollar
amount lost per year due to the attack scenarios analyzed.  After approximately 80
tables, each addressing an attack scenario, it becomes clear where weaknesses exist, and
where additional security measures are needed.Table 6.  Human Error Scenario:  Administration of ftp Access Controls
Stage Instance Effectiveness, likelihood, or
potential loss level
1. Attack
obstruction
Security education:  system administrators are
educated in the importance of the security policy
and the procedures to adhere to it.
Effectiveness (CEAO):  .9
2. Attack
scenario
System administrator inadvertently
misconfigures ftp access controls.
Likelihood (PRA):  3.00
3. Attack
detection
User detection:  system administrator realizes
mistake, or co-worker notices misconfiguration.
Effectiveness (CEAD):  .4
4. Attack
recovery
Firewall reconfiguration:  system administrator
corrects ftp access controls.
Effectiveness (CEAR):  .999
5. Security
breach
Internet hacker discovers flaw, deletes files in
ftp site.
Effective risk (ERB):  .18
6. Breach
detection
Audit log analysis; user detection of file
modification
Effectiveness (CEAD):  .75
7. Breach
recovery
Firewall reconfiguration:  system administrator
resets access controls and restores ftp files.
Effectiveness (CEBR):  .999
8. Harm Loss of ftp site resources and time to restore. Potential loss (PLH):  $4,000
Total effective risk (ERT):  .045
Total effective loss (ELT):  $181
3. LESSONS LEARNED
“Firewalls are the wrong approach.  They don’t solve the general problem, and they make it very difficult
or impossible to do many things.  On the other hand, if I were in charge of a corporate network, I’d never
consider hooking into the Internet without one.  And if I were looking for a likely financially successful
security product to invest in, I’d pick firewalls.”
- Charlie Kaufman [6]
We couldn’t agree more.  Even when the firewall is supplemented with procedural
defenses which rely on the users and administrators, the effective risk is still non-zero.
At the end of each of our assessments, our customers all learned this lesson.  The
following are the additional lessons we learned.
3.1 A False Sense of Security
Firewalls give people the feeling that their systems on the internal network are secure,
which leads to a sense of complacency.  People feel they can “relax.”  Instead, the
firewall has allowed access between the internal and external networks that users
would normally feel a little less comfortable about.  Ironically, internal network users
should be even more concerned.  The comfort provided by the firewall will tend to
increase the flow of message traffic.  The result is that all of the standard security
precautions, e.g. running virus checkers on files that have been brought across the
network, and being leery of e-mail that has been received from unknown sources, must
be done with more consistency.  The primary function of a firewall is to provide abuffer from external attack.  Until firewall-to-firewall authentication mechanisms are in
place, we still suffer the consequences of inside users having access to sensitive
information and the ability to send that information externally.  The opportunity for
error is high and there's no way to prevent that from happening other than through
training and awareness classes. Gasser highlighted this issue in 1988 [11] by stating
"Fads in the computer security area can have a serious negative effect on the overall
progress to achieving good security because progress stops when people think they
have the answer." Firewalls are inherently a crutch. By giving us a sense of protection
from the external network, they allow us to put off addressing long-standing security
issues with the systems on the internal network, such as lack of comprehensive access
control enforced at the enterprise level or sensitivity checks on outgoing information.
RSA Data Security, Inc. is negotiating with leading firewall and TCP/IP stack vendors
to create a security standard that could eliminate a major barrier to building virtual
private networks (VPNs) on the Internet [12]. Even with this in place, it means you are
still extending your trust to network and assuming it is trustworthy. For example, if a
hacker has penetrated the other firewall’s internal network, e.g. through a modem, and
is communicating out through the other firewall, this new level of trust actually poses a
threat to all systems which communicate with the firewall.
3.2 The Relationship between the Security Policy and the Firewall
Assessing this example firewall highlights the requirement that a security policy must
be in place before the methodology can be applied. This requirement gives rise to two
problems. The first is that many organizations, particularly commercial businesses
suddenly coming to grips with the risks of being attached to the Internet for the first
time, are in imminent danger. The immediacy of their need for security overrides the
rational requirement for a well-reasoned, comprehensive policy. It's not even clear that
many of the responsible policy-makers would know how to state their policy
requirements. The second problem comes in translating between the security policy
and the firewall implementation. Since the policy maker and the firewall administrator
are usually different individuals, they may be unclear on the precise impact of their
own decisions on each other's domains. In addition, administering a firewall requires
making frequent, small changes to the configuration, effectively changing the firewall's
security policy dynamically. Fortunately, a firewall, unlike many other security
mechanisms, is well encapsulated. This leads us to an interesting proposal to firewall
makers.
5. FUTURE DIRECTIONS
We recommend automating configuration of the firewall in conjunction with
specification of the security policy. We envision a tool which presents the policy maker
with potential policy statements. Statement selection would produce two outputs: 1) a
human-readable description of the firewall security policy for the policy maker and theend users; 2) the associated configuration for the firewall. The tool should also provide
conflict resolution. Either selection of conflicting policy statements should be
automatically prevented or they should flagged as errors for the policy maker to
resolve manually. In addition, direct changes to the configuration by the system
administrator would be prohibited. Changes would be made through the same tool
which would notify the administrator if an attempted change would violate the
prescribed security policy.
Notice that we have come full circle to the fact that the biggest risk to a secure
environment is still people. The proposed tool removes some of the potential for human
error in the administration of a firewall.
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